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Congressional Power to Expand Judicial
Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the
Civil War Amendments*
Jesse H. Choper**
I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly two decades have now passed since the Supreme
Court, in its 1965 Term, rendered four notable decisions'-the
most controversial being Katzenbach v. Morgan-which,for the
first time in the modern era, extensively addressed the question of Congress's ability to act under the enabling clauses of
the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to secure
the rights guaranteed by the substantive sections of those provisions. In the intervening years, six new Justices have been
appointed, and the Court has been provided with several opportunities to refine, explicate, or modify the doctrines first announced in these salient decisions.
During this period, there has also been a distinct (and at
least potentially substantial) contraction of Congress's authority to legislate pursuant to other of its regulatory powers. In
1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery,2 the Court held that
acts of Congress, otherwise permissible under the commerce
clause, violate the tenth amendment if they regulate "the
States qua States" 3 and interfere with the freedom of state and
local governments "to structure integral operations in areas of
traditional governmental functions." 4 Although the Usery ruling specifically dealt only with the commerce power, there is
* An abbreviated version of this paper was delivered as the William B.
Lockhart Lecture, University of Minnesota Law School, April 13, 1982.
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. I wish
to thank Violet Elizabeth Grayson of the class of 1982 for her exceptionally able
and valuable assistance in the preparation of this paper and Joseph D. Grano
and Paul J. Mishkin for their helpful comments.
1. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
2. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
3. Id. at 847-48.
4. Id. at 852.
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strong reason to believe that its strictures in favor of state sovereignty apply with at least equal force to Congress's taxing
power, which has traditionally been subject to even greater-albeit vaguely delineated-restrictions vis-a-vis the states than
the commerce clause.5 Moreover, although the Usery majority
deliberately expressed no view as to whether its rationale also
affected federal conditional grants of aid to state and local governments pursuant to Congress's spending power,6 it has been
plausibly suggested that Usery may portend new confines on
this authority as well7-the theory being that Congress may be
forbidden to do indirectly through use of the carrot what Usery
bars it from doing directly through use of the stick. Finally,
less than a year ago, inHodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,8 both Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist urged that the Court specify a more restrictive reading of congressional power under the commerce clause as to
regulation of private persons and business, as well as to rules
that affect "the States qua States." 9
Despite the Usery decision and its restraining implications,
the Court has at the same time unequivocally established that
when Congress acts pursuant to the Civil War amendments,
Usery's state sovereignty limitation has no force.lO Thus, as
Congress's authority to protect individual rights under its com5.

Compare New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 582 (1946) ("But so

long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whomsoever earned
and not uniquely capable of being earned only by a State, the Constitution of
the United States does not forbid it merely because its incidence falls also on a
State.") with Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968) ("But while the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of commerce do not cease to
be regulations of commerce because a State is involved. If a State is engaging
in economic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Government
when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its
activities to federal regulation.").
6. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
7. See, e.g., Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE
L.J. 1196, 1261-62 (1977).
8. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
9. Hodel involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. IV 1980),
which placed strict limits upon surface mining of private lands. The Court
unanimously upheld the Act as a valid exercise of congressional power under
the commerce clause. 452 U.S. at 281. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, however, each concurred specially, emphasizing that Congress may act
under its commerce power only to regulate activity which has a "substantial"
effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 305 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 310-11
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
10. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178 (1980); Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
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merce and taxing powers has diminished, the significance of its
enforcement powers under the Civil War amendments has increased. For example, suppose Congress prohibited all state
law schools from using either age or the Law School Admission
Test (LSAT) as a criterion for admission. If legal education
were held to be an "integral government function," under
Usery Congress could not, pursuant to the commerce clause,
dictate the specifics of the state's conduct with respect to that
function. But if Congress acted under the enabling clause of
one of the Civil War amendments, Usery considerations would
not come into play. The sole question would be whether the
hypothetical federal statute came within Congress's Civil War
amendments enforcement powers.
This Article examines the doctrines expounded by the
Supreme Court in the mid-1960's, and the Court's pertinent
holdings since then, to assess the current state of the law regarding Congress's power to define the substantive terms of the
Civil War amendments. The discussion is wholly confined to
the issue of Congress's ability to expand the scope of the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments beyond the
Court's interpretation of those provisions. Although it adverts
to Congress's "remedial" authority to accomplish this goal, the
Article's central concern is with Congress's "definitional"
power to do so. Finally, the Article does not address the validity of acts of Congress-such as the currently pending antiabortion legislationli-that arguably dilute the protections that
the Court has held the fourteenth amendment provides.12
II.

THE SEMINAL DECISION OF KATZENBACH v.
MORGAN

The celebrated ruling in Katzenbach v. Morgan13 provides
the appropriate starting point. In section 4(e) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,14 Congress provided that no person who had
completed the sixth grade in a Spanish language school in Puerto Rico could be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write English. This effectively eliminated New
11. See, e.g., S. 158, H.R. 900, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (providing that
human life begins at conception).
12. For a consideration of the problem in general and, in particular, of the
complex issue of distinguishing expansion from dilution, see W. LOCKHART, Y.
KAmsAR & J. CHOPER, CONsTrrTIoNAL LAw: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
1603-05 (5th ed. 1980).
13. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).

14. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1976).
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York's English literacy test as applied to many of the
thousands of Puerto Ricans resident in that state. The principal argument against the constitutionality of section 4(e) was
based on a Supreme Court decision, just seven years earlier,
involving North Carolina's English literacy test for voting. In
that case, Lassiterv. Northampton County Board of Elections,15
the Court unanimously held that, so long as such state laws are
racially neutral on their face and applied nondiscriminatorily,
they do not violate the equal protection clause of section 1 of
the fourteenth amendment.16 Thus the crucial question
presented to the Court in Morgan was: if these state laws do
not violate equal protection, how can Congress prohibit them
pursuant to its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enforce equal protection?
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of seven, offered alternative and significantly different rationales for holding that
Congress possessed the authority under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enact this provision of the Voting Rights
Act. First, Justice Brennan reasoned, Congress may have
granted Puerto Ricans the vote because "this enhanced political power will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican
community."' 7 In this part of the Morgan opinion-which may
be characterized as its "remedial" branch' 8-- the Court held
that Congress might select any means it thought appropriate to
combat discrimination against a particular ethnic group, a type
of discrimination that the Court itself had long held to violate
equal protection.19 Second, Justice Brennan continued, wholly
apart from any deliberately unequal allocation of government
services to Puerto Ricans, Congress may eliminate a voter qualification that it finds to be "an invidious discrimination."2 0 In
this part of the Morgan opinion-which may be characterized
as its "definitional" branch-the Court reasoned that Congress
15.
16.
17.

360 U.S. 45 (1959).
Id. at 53-54.
384 U.S. at 652.

18. When Justice Brennan speaks of Congress's effort to "secure... nondiscriminatory treatment" for the Puerto Rican community, it is unclear
whether he means that Congress may have been concerned with past discrimination and its likely continuance, as in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 309 (1966), or simply the possibility of some future discrimination. Thus, it
is uncertain whether Congress's power under this branch of Morgan is merely
curative or preventive as well.
19. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
20. 384 U.S. at 654.
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may determine that a governmental practice, which either has
not been subject to judicial review or, alternatively, has been
reviewed and held constitutional, nonetheless violates the
equal protection clause, and that Congress then may act to
combat it. Thus, it would appear that Congress may define for
21
itself the provisions that it is empowered to enforce.
A.

THE PoTENT.iL

BREADTH OF MORGAN'S IMPLICATIONS

As a bold excursion into largely uncharted territory, Katzenbach v. Morgan raises many profound questions. Although
its remedial branch is of only peripheral concern in this Article,
a brief sketch of just some of the issues left unresolved in this
segment of the Morgan opinion illustrates its complexities. Basically, under what circumstances may Congress go beyond enacting traditional remedies-such as criminal penalties and
civil liabilities for concededly unconstitutional conduct-and
prohibit action that is itself constitutional to cure or prevent
constitutional violations? For example, may Congress outlaw
neutrally motivated state laws that have a racially disproportionate impact-which the Court has ruled are generally not violative of equal protection 22-- in order to correct or avoid
intentional discrimination that has been held to violate equal
protection? If so, is this sort of remedy appropriate only when
Congress believes that such intentional discrimination has actually occurred or that there is a special danger that it will take
place in the future? Must Congress make "findings" with respect to such existing or potential discrimination? If so, how
precise and well documented must these findings be? Must
Congress identify a particular culprit and specific unconstitutional incidents, or may it simply cite to the nation's long history of both official and private racial discrimination? What
relationship, if any, must Congress show between its findings
with respect to prior or potential discrimination and the remedy it imposes? What degree of deference will the Court grant
Congress with respect to any or all of these matters?
Pursuant to Morgan's definitional branch--on which the remainder of this Article will focus-is Congress, in enforcing the
fourteenth amendment, limited to outlawing specific state prac21. In a footnote to its opinion, the Court emphasized that Congress may
so redefine the fourteenth amendment only in ways that expand its provisions:
"§ 5 grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute" the guarantees of
the amendment. Id at 651 n.10.
22. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
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tices such as English literacy tests for voting (or, indeed, perhaps just the literacy tests of some states like New York)? Or
does its definitional power extend more broadly to creating
new suspect classifications or new fundamental rights that
must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny when burdened? May
Congress--contrary to such rulings as Washington v. Davis23

and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 2 4 -determiine that de
facto as well as de jure discrimination against judicially declared suspect and quasi-suspect classes is presumptively violative of equal protection? With respect to due process, may
Congress overturn decisions such as Bishop v. Wood25 and Paul
v. Davis26 by redefining what constitutes a "property" or "liberty" interest that cannot be denied without adequate procedural protections? 2 7 May it alter the result in cases like
Mathews v. Eldridge28-which held that no evidentiary hearing
is required prior to termination of disability benefits-by striking a new balance in respect to the factors that the Court has
held must be weighed in making this judgment? May Congress
require the states to use the Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure on the theory that in its view such use is needed
to assure that due process be accorded all litigants? May Congress determine--contrary to the Court's ruling in Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily29-that police searches of newspaper offices for
evidence of crires does abridge the first amendment freedom
of the press (made applicable to the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment) and thereby prohibit such practices?30 Similarly, may Congress establish a first
amendment news reporter's privilege by ascertaining as an empirical matter--contrary to the Court's rationale in Branzburgv.
Hayes 3 1-that confidential sources will be deterred from providing information to journalists if those journalists may be
23. Id.
24. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
25. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
26. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
27. See generally Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process
Rights, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1265, 1278-80 (1980) (suggesting that under Morgan,
Congress has the power to expand the class of government entitlements protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
28. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
29. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
30. See Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5 to
2000aa-7, 2000aa-11, 2000aa-12 (Supp. IV 1980) (limiting governmental search

and seizure of documentary materials possessed by persons reasonably believed to have as a purpose the dissemination to the public of a newspaper,
book, broadcast, or offer similar form of public communication).
31. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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compelled to disclose the names of their sources to government
investigative agencies? More broadly, may Congress conclude-despite the implications of the Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney 32-that the judicially
constructed constitutional right of privacy comprehends all
consensual sexual acts performed privately by adults? More
generally, may Congress enlarge the concept of "state action"for example, by extending Shelley v. Kraemer3 3 beyond its
present confines3 4 and declaring that judicial enforcement of
any private transaction makes it subject to the constitutional
restraints of due process and equal protection? As for the thirteenth amendment, may Congress prohibit all actions-state
and private-that have a racially disproportionate impact on
the ground that they constitute "badges and incidents of slavery"?3 5 May it broaden the traditional reach of the anti-slavery
prohibition to include discriminations against ethnic minorities
and women? Under the enabling clause of the fifteenth amendment, may Congress adopt the minority view in City of Mobile
v. Bolden36 to bar all electoral systems that have the effect of
diminishing black voting power, irrespective of the purpose behind the scheme?
Further, if Congress has the power to effect any or all of
such changes in constitutional doctrine, must it make special
findings before doing so? If so, must such findings bear any
particular relation to judicially established doctrine? For example, if Congress does have the authority to create a new suspect
classification, must it determine-as the Court suggested in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodiguez37-that
the members of the newly favored group have "the traditional
indicia of suspectness: ... saddled with such disabilities, or
subjected to such history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process"? 38 At a minimum, must Congress conclude that
the suspect class that it has created is a "discrete and insular
minority" within the meaning of United States v. Carolene
32. 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
33. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
34. See W. LOCKHART, Y. K
msAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 12, at 1534-36 for
a survey of alternative interpretations of Shelley.
35. This substantive question has been left open by the Court. See City of
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 120 (1981).

36. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
37. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38. Id. at 28.
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Products Co. ?9 Overall, what deference does the Court owe to
congressional determinations under Morgan's definitional
branch?40
If Morgan's definitional branch were to be construed
broadly, and if it enjoyed continued vitality, then the hypothetical federal statute prohibiting state law schools from using age
or the LSAT as admissions criteria-and virtually all other conceivable exercises of congressional power (except those that
"dilute" constitutionally secured personal rights) 4 1 -could be
quite easily upheld. First, and most encompassingly, Congress
could be said to have designated legal education a fundamental
right, contrary to the Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School Districtv. Rodriguez.4 2 Thus, any state discrimination with respect to exercise of this right would be subject to
strict scrutiny. Under this standard, Congress could readily be
found to have concluded that neither age nor the LSAT were
necessary to any compelling interest in connection with state
legal education.4 3 Second, Congress could be found to have decided that age is a suspect classification-again despite existing
judicial precedents 4 4 -and that state law schools have no compelling interest in excluding older applicants. 45 Third, given
the well known fact that use of the LSAT disproportionately
disadvantages members of at least some racial and ethnic mi39. 304 U.S. 144, 153 nA (1938).
40. Both branches of Morgan in concert raise an overarching issue. If Congress is granted sufficiently broad power under the remedial branch-that is, if
"findings" requirements are lax, and discretion with respect to remedies is plenary-how great a difference is there between what Congress may accomplish
under its definitional power as compared with its remedial power? This matter
is especially significant because-as this Article will illustrate-there are strong
reasons to believe that the definitional branch may in fact afford Congress a
much more modest authority than the quite revolutionary reach of the above
stated hypothetical questions suggest.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 55-57, 105-110.
42. 411 U.S. at 35.
43. A further ramification of this hypothetical federal statute might be that
persons who qualified for admission to state law schools, but who could not afford to pay the required tuition, would contend that this unconstitutionally burdened the exercise of the fundamental right. They would in effect urge that
Congress had also overturned the Court's contrary conclusion in San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, id. at 18-28, as to this argument, and that they
were therefore entitled to a tuition-free state legal education.
44. See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 96-97 (1979); Murgia v. Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
45. The consequences of designating age a suspect classification would be
substantially more far-reaching than designating legal education a fundamental
right since it might permit successful challenges to all government rules that
burden people on the basis of their advancing years.
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nority groups in the admissions process, 46 the hypothetical
statute could be upheld on the theory that Congress had rejected the principle of Washington v. Davis47-at least where
law school admission was concerned-and decided that de
facto as well as de jure discrimination against such persons violated equal protection. Finally, Congress might be found to
have chosen to ban this type of de facto discrimination by labeling it a "badge or incident of slavery" within the meaning of
the thirteenth amendment, thus resolving an issue undecided
in the recent case of City of Memphis v. Greene.4

B. THE OPINION'S DEFINITIONAL DISCUSSION
The portion of the Morgan opinion expounding its definitional branch is contained in a single paragraph, supplemented
by five footnotes.4 9 It thus seems oddly sparse and casual in
view of the theory's potentially radical impact. This discussion
begins after the Court has already adequately disposed of the
case under the remedial rationale-that is, that Congress enacted section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act in order to secure
nondiscriminatory treatment for the Puerto Rican community
in obtaining various government services.5 0 Rather than end
the matter there, however, Justice Brennan advances an alternative holding: 'The result is no different if we confine our inquiry to the question whether § 4(e) was merely legislation
aimed at the elimination of an invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications." 5 1 Congress, the Court explains,
may have questioned "whether denial of a right deemed so precious and fundamental [as voting] was a necessary or appropriate means [to serve New York's purported ends] of
encouraging persons to learn English, or of furthering the goal
of an intelligent exercise of the franchise." 52 In doing so, Congress might properly bring its "specially informed legislative
competence" to bear in this area, "weigh ... [the] competing
considerations," and then forbid application of the literacy test
46. See A. NAnIN, REIGN OF ETS, THE CORPORATION THAT MAKES UP MINDS
225 (1980).
47. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
48. 451 U.S. 100 (1981). See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Note
that this theory would readily permit the coverage of the hypothetical federal
statute to be extended to all private law schools as well. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168-75 (1976).
49. 384 U.S. at 653-56 & nn.13-17.
50. Id. at 652.
51. Id. at 653-54.
52. Id. at 654.
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pursuant to its power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to enforce equal protection. 53 Justice Brennan concludes
by emphasizing the extreme deference that the Court will afford to congressional judgments of this kind: "[I]t is enough
that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate
a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy
requirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth
grade education in Puerto Rican schools in which the language
of instruction was other than English constituted an invidious
54
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause."
Prominent scholars-and (as shall be seen) Supreme
Court Justices-have quite clearly interpreted this passage in
Morgan as, to some significant extent, assigning "Congress to
the post of constitutional interpreter,"55 and making the national legislative branch "the final arbiter of the meaning of the
Constitution."5 6 Thus, in an early and important post-Morgan
analysis, Archibald Cox found that "for the future the decision
logically permits the generalization that Congress, in the field
of state activities and except as confined by the Bill of Rights,
has the power to enact any law which may be viewed as a
measure for correction of any condition which Congress might
believe involves a denial of equality or other fourteenth amendment rights."5 7 Indeed, quite apart from the Court's language
in Morgan, conventional judicial construction of the scope of
congressional power under the commerce clause-which (at
least since 1937) effectively authorizes Congress to define "interstate commerce" for itself58 by affording Congress virtually
unreviewable discretion to determine whether any local activities affect commerce in more than one state-lends substantial
support to granting Congress the same leeway in defining the
substantive terms of the Civil War amendments.
But Morgan's definitional branch need not be read so expansively. Indeed, careful parsing of the opinion's abbreviated
discussion leads persuasively to the conclusion that it probably
stands for nothing more than the proposition that Congress
may scrutinize any state regime which the Court has found to
53. Id. at 656.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
55.

L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUTIONAL LAw 266 (1978).

56. Burt, Mirandaand Title II: A MorganaticMarriage,1969 Sup. CT. REV.
81, 84.
57. Cox, ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights,
80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966). See also Cohen, CongressionalPower to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).
58. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAmSAR & J. CHOPER, supra note 12, at 122-55.
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be constitutionally questionable because it involves a suspect
classification or a fundamental right. On this reading, Morgan's
definitional branch merely permits Congress to investigate the
facts surrounding state action of this type and then prohibit the
practice if, in Congress's judgment, it lacks the compelling basis which the Court demands to uphold it. It is true that under
this reading of Morgan's definitional branch, Congress is free to
invalidate government actions that the Court has already upheld or might otherwise uphold in the future. But this would
only permit Congress to "expand" on judicial conceptions of
equal protection (and due process) in those very limited situations where Congress, with its special competence in the circumstances, 5 9 has appraised the relevant factors and concluded
that the law (already declared vulnerable by the judiciary) is
not justified by the required state interest-a decision which
differs from that which the Court, with its more limited capabilities, either has already reached or would otherwise make
when the issue was presented to it. Thus, in enacting section
4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, Congress might be said to have
concluded that, in its judgment, contrary to the Court's holding
in the Lassiter case, there was no compelling basis for states'
denying the franchise to persons not literate in English.
This explanation of Morgan's definitional branch is not
without difficulty. In 1966, when Morgan was decided, the
Court had yet to formally proclaim the right to vote to be "fundamental" and thus subject to strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause. That announcement did not come until three
years later in Kramer v. Union Free School District.60 But despite the fact that, as of 1966, the Lassiter ruling-upholding
the constitutionality of racially neutral literacy tests that were
applied in a nondiscriminatory fashion-was still the law, it is
clear that the doctrinal trend that ultimately resulted in the
Court's pronouncement in Kramer was virtually complete
when the Court decided Morgan. In 1964, in Reynolds v.
Sims, 61 which mandated the rule of one person-one vote, the
Court observed that "the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society... [and,] especially
since . .. [it] is preservative of other basic civil and political.
rights, any alleged infringement... must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized."62 In 1965, in Carrington v. Rash, 63 in
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See infra text accompanying note 113.
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 561-62.
380 U.S. 89 (1965).
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holding that a Texas law was an "invidious discrimination" because it prohibited military personnel stationed in the state
from voting in local elections, the Court noted that it dealt
64
"with matters close to the core of our constitutional system."
Similarly, in 1966, in Harperv. Virginia Board of Elections 65 in
ruling that Virginia's poll tax was an "invidious discrimination"
in violation of equal protection, the Court reemphasized that
voting was a "fundamental political right, because preservative
of all rights."66
Thus, at the time that Justice Brennan wrote the Court's
opinion in Morgan, he was plainly aware of the Court's nearly
completed march to making voting a fundamental right. As a
consequence, in reviewing Congress's decision to enfranchise
certain Puerto Rican residents in New York, it was wholly understandable for Justice Brennan to have asked whether Congress might reasonably have concluded that there was no
compelling basis for denying these citizens the right to vote.
That this was the crux of the rationale for Morgan's definitional
branch and that Justice Brennan's opinion presaged the
Court's subsequent explicit holding that voting came within the
fundamental rights branch of equal protection is forcefully confirmed by a footnote in Morgan which invoked Carrington and
the
Harper to support the following statement: "True, ...
[Voting Rights Act] precludes, for a certain class, disenfranchisement and thus limits the States' choice of means of
satisfying a purported state interest. But our cases have held
that the States can be required to tailor carefully the means of
satisfying a legitimate state interest when fundamental liberties and rights are threatened ... and Congress is free to apply
67
the same principle in the exercise of its powers."
An additional indication that the definitional branch of the
Court's opinion in Morgan does not grant Congress any vast
64. Id. at 96.
65. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
66. Id. at 667 (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
67. 384 U.S. at 655 n.15 (citations omitted). A problem with this analysis
arises when one asks how Congress, which was not privy to the Carringtonand
Harper decisions at the time that it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
might have been sufficiently familiar with the relevance to voting of the strict
scrutiny approach to investigate the issue of whether New York had a compelling basis for disenfranchising persons not literate in English. The answer to
this question is two-fold. First, Reynolds v. Sims had already been decided.
Second, the Morgan majority did not ask whether Congress in fact found that
New York lacked a compelling basis for denying the franchise to Puerto Ricans
not literate in English, but rather, whether Congress could have done so.
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authority to determine the substantive content of the provisions of the fourteenth amendment is contained in approximately a dozen words of the Morgan text which suggest that
New York's literacy requirement was originally enacted for the
racial purpose of disenfranchising persons of non-Anglo-Saxon
descent. In the midst of his skimpy "definitional" discussion,
Justice Brennan appears parenthetically to change the direction of his argument and mentions the existence of "some evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in the
enactment of the [literacy] requirement." 68 In a footnote, he
then quotes a statement made at New York's constitutional
convention of 1916, which refers to "the mental qualities of our
race" and plainly suggests that the voter literacy requirement
was enacted to disenfranchise "Southern and Eastern European races."69 If this fragmentary discussion by Justice Brennan means that the Court itself found New York's literacy
requirement to be the product of intentional racial discrimination, then its elimination by Congress went no further than existing judicial doctrine and, therefore, any suggestion in
Morgan of Congress's having any "definitional" powers is at
most dicta. As shall be seen,7 0 however, this "parenthetical"
aspect of Justice Brennan's discussion may not fairly be so
construed, and, indeed, it implies a significant congressional capacity to enact "prophylactic" legislation and move beyond the
judiciary's prerogatives in dealing with certain problems of racial discrimination under the equal protection clause. But despite the potentiality of this part of Morgan's definitional
discussion, it still falls far short of granting the legislative
branch anything like an unbounded authority to interpret for itself the substantive terms of the Civil War amendments.
The strongest direct evidence against the view that Morgan
grants Congress only a limited "definitional" power begins in
Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion, which Justice Stewart
joined. From this single paragraph containing Morgan's definitional discussion, Justice Harlan draws the conclusion that the
Court has given Congress "the power to define the substantive
scope of the [Fourteenth] Amendment." 71 He then vigorously
protests this doctrine on the ground that it authorizes Congress
"to exercise its § 5 'discretion' by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute [as well as expand] equal protection and due pro68. 384 U.S. at 654.
69. Id. at 654 n.14.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 154-86.
71. 384 U.S. at 668.
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cess decisions of this Court."72 Justice Brennan's response to
Justice Harlan, found in a much discussed footnote of the
Court's opinion,7 3 tends to confirm the dissent's characterization of the majority's position. Citing the language used by Justice Harlan to describe and condemn the Court's definitional
theory, Justice Brennan denies only that the Court's rationale
allows Congress to dilute fourteenth amendment rights, thus
implying acceptance of Justice Harlan's assertion that the
Court has indeed empowered Congress to define the substantive scope of the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. It is always dangerous, however, to interpret an opinion
of the Court by relying on the meaning attributed by those who
disagree with it. The fact that the majority does not expressly
refute the dissent's characterization of its views does not reveal
that the Court has adopted that description. 74 Thus, it is appropriate to look to the Court's subsequent opinions on the point
in order to discern more accurately the true nature of Morgan's
"definitional" branch.
UI. THE RELEVANCE OF JONES v.
ALFRED H. MAYER CO.
The most forceful additional evidence of a broad definitional power for Congress under the Civil War amendments
may be found in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 75 decided two
years after Morgan. Jones may be construed as applying-albeit with minimal explanation-Morgan's definitional analysis
to the thirteenth amendment. Relying on Congress's authority
under the enabling clause of the thirteenth amendment, the
Court in Jones upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute,
enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,76 which the
Court interpreted as prohibiting racial discrimination in the
sale or rental of housing by private persons as well as governmental officials. After noting that the thirteenth amendment
72. Id.
73. Id. at 651 n.10.
74. There is no reason to believe that Justice Brennan's pruning of Morgan's definitional branch would have produced a unanimous Court. Although
Justices Harlan and Stewart agreed with the basic theory of Morgan's remedial
branch, they found the legislative record inadequate to sustain a finding that
the Puerto Rican minorities were subject to unconstitutional discrimination requiring remedial legislation. Id. at 669.
75. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
76. The statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, was, in its original form, part
of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1976)).
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governed private action as well as state action, the Court reasoned: "Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth
Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and
the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate that determination into effective legislation." 77 Interestingly, the
Court cites neither Katzenbach v. Morgan nor any other authority for this extremely fertile principle under which, at the
least, Congress would appear to be capable of outlawing virtually all deliberate racial discrimination-private as well as offi78
cial-in the United States.
It is true that there are passages in the Jones opinion that
may be read to say that the Court would interpret the thirteenth amendment, of its own force, to prohibit private racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of property. 79 Under this
view, the language in Jones, seemingly granting Congress spacious definitional power under the thirteenth amendment, may
be construed as being not only an ipse dixit but pure dicta as
well, that in no way advances Morgan's definitional rationale.
But nothing in any Supreme Court case before or after Jones
suggests that the Court, despite uncounted opportunities to do
so, would itself define the coverage of the thirteenth amendment in a fashion broad enough to encompass the kinds of unofficial racial discrimination-regarding such matters as access
to private schools or private recreational parks8 0-that the
Court has held Congress prohibited (and had power to prohibit) in the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Indeed, in its recent ruling in City of Memphis v. Greene,81 the Court specifically stated
that Jones "left open the question whether § 1 of the [Thirteenth] Amendment by its own terms did anything more than
abolish [formal] slavery."8 2
Nonetheless, Jones need not be interpreted as conferring
any definitional authority on Congress. Rather, it can be persuasively argued on either of two theories that the Court upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as only a remedial exercise of
Congress's enforcement power under the thirteenth amendment. First, "'slavery' may be regarded as a status to be de77. Id. at 440.
78. The fact that Justice Stewart, who authored Jones, dissented in Morgan probably explains his aversion to any reliance on Morgan's definitional
branch.
79. 392 U.S. at 441-43.
80. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1976); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 234-37 (1969).
81. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
82. Id. at 125-26.
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, and the 'badges and incidents of

slavery' may be regarded, not as elements of that definition, but
as stigmas and disabilities related to slavery .... Thus to say

that Congress may rationally determine the badges and incidents of slavery is nothing more than to say that Congress may
prohibit certain practices, although those practices themselves
do not constitute slavery, when Congress rationally finds that
their prohibition will help to prevent slavery."83 Alternatively,
since Congress's power under Morgan's remedial branch encompasses eradicating the effects of constitutional violations as
well as preventing future ones, 84 the congressional prohibition

in Jones may be readily sustained as an effort to eliminate the
persistent legacies of the past condition of slavery. Both of
these "remedial" approaches find support in the Court's language characterizing the 1866 Civil Rights Act as seeking to assure that "equal treatment for the Negro would ... be
secured,"85 and in statements by the law's sponsors (quoted by
the Court) that "[t]he end is the maintenance of freedom ....
A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned in this bill cannot
86
be reduced to slavery."
This explanation of Jones, which greatly limits its authority
for confirming Morgan's broader definitional implications, is
substantiated by Grffin v. Breckenridge,87 decided three years
later. In Griffin, the Court relied on the Jones reasoning to uphold Congress's creation of a civil damage action against persons who conspired for purposes of racial animus to deprive
black citizens of their constitutional rights. In reaching its conclusion, the Court found the federal statute to be a fulfillment
of the thirteenth amendment's promise that "the former slaves
and their descendants should be forever free."8 8
IV. THE EXPLANATIONS IN OREGON v. MITCHELL
The Justices's most thorough-if not most informativeconsideration of the scope of Morgan's definitional branch to
date came in 1970 with the case of Oregon v. Mitchell.89 That
83. D. ENGDAHL, CONSTrTUIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE IN A NuTSHELL 247-48 (1974) (emphasis added).
84. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480, 482 (1980); City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172-78 (1980).
85. 392 U.S. at 429.
86. Id. at 443-44.
87. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
88. Id. at 105.
89. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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case involved the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act
amendments of 197090 which, among other things, lowered the
voting age to eighteen for both state and federal elections. Oregon produced five separate opinions. By shifting majorities,
the Court sustained the voting age provision for federal elections, but invalidated it as applied to state and local elections.
Although no opinion attracted a majority vote, two of the opinions-each joined in by three Justices-contain the views of
five current members of the Court. Thus, scrutiny of those
opinions should shed some light on the position the present
Court may be expected to take.
A.

JUSTICES BRENNAN, WHITE AND MARSHALL

In Oregon, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White and
Marshall-who were also part of the majority in Katzenbach v.
Morgan 9 l-voted to uphold the eighteen year old voting provision in its entirety. This afforded these Justices an excellent
opportunity to clarify Morgan's definitional theory.
On the one hand, it would have been possible for Justice
Brennan never to have reached the issue of Congress's definitional power. His rationale could have been that the Court's
1969 decision in Kramer v. Union Free School District,92 which
held voting to be a fundamental right for equal protection purposes, itself required the states to enfranchise persons between
eighteen and twenty-one years of age. Indeed, Justice Brennan
begins his consideration of the eighteen-year-old provision by
stating that "there is a serious question whether a statute
granting the franchise to citizens 21 and over while denying it
to those between the ages of 18 and 21 could . . . withstand
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause." 93 He then discusses at length why this "admitted restriction upon the
franchise... [is] supported only by bare assertions and long
practice, in the face of strong indications that the States themselves do not credit the factual propositions upon which the restriction is asserted to rest."94 But, having laid a firm basis for
90. Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314, 315 (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973, 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa-1973bb-4 (1976)).
91. Apart from Justice Douglas, these three Justices were the only members of the original Morgan majority remaining on the Court at the time that
Oregon was decided. Justice Douglas concurred with the result of Justice
Brennan's Oregon opinion.
92. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
93. 400 U.S. at 240.
94. Id. at 246.
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judicial invalidation of a state law denying the vote to eighteen
year olds, he then emphatically states that
there is no reason for us to decide whether, in a proper case, we would
be compelled to hold this restriction a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. For as our decisions have long made clear, the question we
face today is not one of judicial power under the Equal Protection
Clause. The question is the scope of congressional power under § 5 of
95
the Fourteenth Amendment ....

Careful reading of that part of Justice Brennan's opinion
which sustains Congress's power to lower the voting age in
state and local elections discloses that its rationale mirrors that
which I have suggested96 was employed in his opinion for the
Court in Morgan. In the intervening period, the Kramer decision, although not passing on the question of whether the equal
protection clause of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment required the states to enfranchise eighteen year olds, 97 made
clear that, as a general rule, denials of the vote would be subject to judicial review under the test of strict scrutiny-that is,
the exclusion would have to be "necessary to promote a compelling state interest." 98 In Oregon, the issue for Justice Brennan was whether Congress could properly have found that no
compelling basis existed for excluding eighteen year olds.99
95. Id.
96. See supra text accompanying note 59.
97. Kramer specifically noted that no attack had been made on the challenged law's requirement that voters "be at least 21 years of age." 395 U.S. at
623 n.2. See also infra note 99.
98. 395 U.S. at 627.
99. One argument that may be raised in objection to this account of Justice
Brennan's approach in Oregon is that, unlike most exclusions from the
franchise, denial of the vote to persons under the age of twenty-one is not subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of § 1 of the fourteenth
amendment because such discrimination is expressly authorized by § 2 of the
fourteenth amendment. (Section 2 provides for reduced congressional representation for any state that denies the vote to its citizens, but exempts several
kinds of state franchise limitations from this proscription-including denial of
the vote to those under twenty-one years of age and to persons convicted of
criminal offenses.) Indeed, the Court's "compelling state interest" formulation
in Kramer stated explicitly that it applied to denials of the franchise to "bona
fide residents of requisite age and citizenship." 395 U.S. at 627 (emphasis added).
That this point carried no force for Justice Brennan was made plain in the
subsequent decision of Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), in which Justice Brennan joined Justice Marshall's dissent from the Court's endorsement of
this rationale. The majority in Ramirez held that a state's disenfranchising
convicted felons was authorized by § 2 of the fourteenth amendment and thus
not subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause of § 1. Justices
Brennan and Marshall contended that "§ 2 was not intended and should not be
construed to be a limitation on the other sections of the Fourteenth Amendment," relying specifically for this proposition on Justice Brennan's opinion in
Oregon. Id. at 74-75 (dissenting opinion).
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"Regardless of... [the Court's] answer to this question,.., it
is clear to us that proper regard for the special function of Congress in making determinations of legislative fact compels this
Court to respect those determinations unless they are contradicted by evidence far stronger than anything that has been adduced in these cases."10 0 Thus, Congress exercised its
authority under the definitional branch of Morgan to find that
no compelling basis existed for denying the vote to persons between eighteen and twenty-one years of age. To the extent that
Congress thereby effected an "expansion" of rights under the
Civil War amendments, it did so only by embellishing existing
judicial doctrine.
This explanation of Justice Brennan's rationale in Oregon-in terms of Congress's power to find whether there is the
compelling basis necessary for state laws that the Court has
held are subject to strict scrutiny-is derived quite clearly from
the text of his opinion. Justice Brennan opens the key section
of his discussion with the statement that "questions of constitutional power frequently turn in the last analysis on questions
of fact."' 0 1 'This," he continues, "is particularly the case when
an assertion of state power is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 0 2 Shortly
thereafter, he concludes:
Should Congress, pursuant to... [its section 5] power, undertake an
investigation in order to determine whether the factual basis necessary
to support a state legislative discrimination actually exists, it need not
stop once it determines that some reasonable men could believe the
factual basis exists. Section 5 empowers Congress to make its own determination on the matter. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
654, 656 (1966).103 It should hardly be necessary to add that if the asserted factual basis necessary to support a given state discrimination
with
does not exist, § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment vests Congress
10 4
power to remove the discrimination by appropriate means.

Contrary to my analysis of Justice Brennan's opinion in Oregon, it has been suggested that his discussion either.
100. 400 U.S. at 240.
101. Id. at 246. Justice Brennan frequently characterizes the process by
which Congress determines whether the compelling basis necessary to support
a statutory discrimination exists as involving "questions of fact." Id. As his
discussion makes clear, this process comprehends both "adjudicative facts"
and "legislative facts"--i.e., both empirical and normative judgments. See generally 2 K. DAvis, ADnm-mSTRATrvE LAw TREATISE § 12:3 (1979); C. McCoIMIcK,

LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 328, 331 (2d ed. 1972).
102. 400 U.S. at 426.
103. The cited pages to the Morgan opinion contain its definitional branch
paragraph.

104. 400 U.S. at 248.
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(a) grants Congress broad authority to actually define for itself
the substantive terms of the fourteenth amendment; or
(b) vests the legislative branch with comparably vast power to
preempt any state statute that draws distinctions which Congress finds to be irrational and therefore violative of equal protection. 105 It is true that one may infer from some passages of
Justice Brennan's opinion that he intended to empower Congress not simply with the modest capacity to invalidate government action where judicially created doctrine requires strict
scrutiny, but also with the much larger authority to outlaw
state and local rules where existing decisions of the Court
would apply only a rational basis test:
When a state legislative classification is subjected to judicial challenge
as violating the Equal Protection Clause, it comes before the courts
cloaked by the presumption that the legislature has, as it should, acted
within constitutional limitations ....
Accordingly, "[a] statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the
laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it ."
But ... this limitation on judicial review of state legislative classifications is a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but from the nature of judicial review .... The nature of
the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will overturn a legislative
determination of a factual question only if the legislative finding is so
clearly wrong that it may be characterized as "arbitrary," "irrational,"
or "unreasonable."
Limitations stemming from the nature of the judicial process, however, have no application to Congress .... Should Congress, pursuant
to ... [its section 5] power, undertake an investigation in order to determine whether the factual basis necessary to support a state legislative liscrimination actually exists, it need not stop once it determines
that some reasonable men could believe the factual basis exists. Section 5 106
empowers Congress to make its own determination on the
matter.

Read literally-and uncritically-this approach grants Congress a virtually boundless prerogative, limited only by those
provisions of the Constitution securing individual rights. Since
all laws classify (or "discriminate") by imposing special burdens (or granting exemptions from such burdens), or by conferring special benefits on some people and not others, 0 7 under
this theory Congress may substitute its judgment for that of a
state or local lawmaking body whenever it wishes to do so.
105. See, e.g., Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations,
40 U. Cm. L. REV. 199, 233 (1971).
106. 400 U.S. at 246-48 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
107. See W. LOCKHART, Y. K-azsA & J. CHOPER, supra note 12, at 1245.
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Moreover, since it is now clearly established that Usery's state
sovereignty limitation on Congress's article I powers is inoperative when Congress legislates pursuant to the enabling clauses
of the Civil War amendments,108 Congress may, on this interpretation of Justice Brennan's reasoning, freely interfere with
the structure of integral state and local government functions.
Indeed, this rationale endorses the most generous exegesis of
Morgan's definitional branch-at least in respect to the equal
protection clause-effectively permitting Congress to "formulat[e] the applicable legal standard"109 for that provision. To illustrate, it would readily allow Congress "to make its own
determination" that age and the LSAT are "'arbitrary,' 'irrational,' or 'unreasonable"' criteria for admission to state law
schools and thus eliminate them. Yet more broadly, it would
appear to erect no barrier against a federal statute that simply
declared that all state discriminations against persons on the
basis of age-or sexual preference, or occupationnlO-are "'arbitrary,' 'irrational,' or 'unreasonable"' and thus invalidated all
such regulations.
Closer examination of Justice Brennan's opinion, however,
suggests that he proposed no such radical thesis. In a footnote
to that section here under discussion, Brennan dispels the notion that Congress is empowered to supersede any state classification that it wishes. On the contrary, the footnote confirms
this Article's analysis that Justice Brennan's Oregon opinion
deals only with the precise issue before the Court-the power
of Congress to determine whether state legislation lacks the
compelling basis necessary to withstand the strict scrutiny imposed by Kramer:"'
The state of facts necessary to justify a legislative discrimination will

of course vary with the nature of the discrimination involved. When
we have been faced with statutes involving nothing more than state
regulation of business practices, we have often found mere administrative convenience sufficient to justify the discrimination. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487, 488-489 (1955). But when a
discrimination has the effect of denying or inhibiting the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights, we have required that it be not
108. See supra text accompanying note 10.
109. Cox, supra note 105, at 237 n.145.
110. Cf.Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (statute making it a
misdemeanor to engage "in the business of debt adjusting," except as an incident to "the lawful practice of law," does not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 48889 (1955) (to subject opticians to a regulatory system while exempting sellers of
ready-to-wear glasses does not violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100.
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merely convenient, but necessary. Kramer v. Union School District,
395 U.S., at 627; Carringtonv. Rash, 380 U.S., at 96 ....
And we have
required as well that it be necessary to promote not merely a constitutionally permissible state interest, but a state interest of substantial
importance. Kramer v. Union School Distric supra .... 112

When Congress finds, contrary to an earlier (or subsequent) judicial determination, that a state classification is not
"necessary to a compelling state interest," the congressional
judgment is made pursuant to the particularly approlpriate legislative task of investigating and evaluating complex factual
and policy questions. Since Congress is much more to be
trusted in assessing, the strength of government interests than
in assessing the interests of individuals without substantial influence in the political process," 3 a congressional conclusion of
this kind is especially entitled to judicial deference. It rejects
government interests that the Court chose not to reject (although the Court could have and almost always does reject
such interests under the compelling interest test) 114, and furthermore, it advances individual interests already favored by
the Court's having taken the major step of holding that the
state classification (involving either a suspect group or fundamental right) should be subject to strict scrutiny. It is but a
modest step for the Court in these circumstances to hold that it
will accept any "reasonable" congressional determination that
the state law being eliminated does not survive strict scrutiny.
It is vastly different, however, for the Court to adopt the
principle that it will defer to any "reasonable" congressional
determination that a state law is "'arbitrary,' 'irrational,' or 'unreasonable."' This type of congressional finding is not based
on the evaluation of complex empirical and normative issues; it
does not constitute a discretionary judgment that the national
legislature is specially competent to make. Rather it represents
112. 400 U.S. at 247 n.30.
113. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrICAL PROCESS:
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 201-03

(1980).
Although, as indicated supra in text accompanying notes 11-12, the subject
is beyond the scope of discussion in this Article, this factor-whether the national political branches may be trusted to produce a satisfactorily fair constitutional judgment-is, in my view, critical in distinguishing the situation under
consideration (i.e., Congress's determining that a law is not "necessary to a
compelling state interest") from one where Congress concludes that a regulation is "necessary to a compelling state interest" despite the fact that the Court
has held (or would hold) otherwise.
114. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (rejecting state-imposed requirement that one own taxable realty to vote in school
district election).
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a statement in respect to a most straightforward matter-that
no "state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify" the
state regulation." 5 There appears no reason to believe that
Congress is any more capable than the Court of making this
hypothetical assessment. For the Court to permit Congress
any significant leeway in respect to this issue (or in determining that the goal of a state law is not "constitutionally permissible"" 6 despite the Court's judgment to the contrary) is to
authorize Congress to overturn any state or local rule with
which it disagrees. Congress would have only to conclude that
a classification drawn by the law is "'arbitrary,' 'irrational,' or
'unreasonable'" (or that the law's object is not "constitutionally permissible") and thus violative of equal protection-or,
since the constitutional standard is identical," 7 that the link
between the law's purported end and the means used to
achieve it suffers the same defect (or that the law's end is itself
constitutionally impermissible) and thus violates substantive
due process. There is very little, if any, meaningful support for
this view-so subversive of our traditional ideas about federalism-in either the Court's opinion in Morgan or Justice Brennan's opinion in Oregon.

B. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, JUSTICE BLACKMuN (AND JUSTICE
STEWART)

Whatever ambiguities may lie in Justice Brennan's Oregon
opinion concerning the reach of Morgan's definitional branch,
Justice Stewart's opinion in Oregon-joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun (both of whom were not on the
Court when Morgan was decided)-leaves few doubts as to
their views. Justice Stewart concludes that the eighteen-yearold voting rule is unconstitutional as applied to both state and
federal elections. Unwilling to urge outright abandonment of a
doctrine that the Court established over his dissent only four
years earlier, Justice Stewart's opinion essentially denies the
existence of Morgan's definitional branch.118
Initially, Justice Stewart points out that the Court's deci115. See supra text accompanying note 106.
116. See supra text accompanying note 112.
117. See W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR &J. CHOPER, supra note 12, at 449-52.
118. By contrast, Justice Harlan, whose dissent Justice Stewart joined in
Morgan, directly confronts Morgan's implications:
[W] ere I to continue to consider myself constricted by recent past decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment reaches state electoral processes, I would ...
be led to
cast my vote with those of my Brethren who are of the opinion that the

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:299

sion in Kramer v. Union School District" 9 did not reject "the
undoubted power of a State to establish a qualification for voting based on age."' 20 Therefore, Congress's eighteen-year-old
provision could be upheld only if section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment authorized Congress to make its own determination that denial of the franchise to persons between eighteen
and twenty-one years of age violated the equal protection
clause. In Justice Stewart's view, "neither the Morgan case,
nor any other case upon which the Government relies, establishes such congressional power, even assuming that all those
cases were rightly decided."121
Justice Stewart explained Morgan's upholding of the statute enfranchising Puerto Ricans on two grounds, both of which
he found to be "farreaching."122 First, he pointed to Morgan's
"remedial" branch: "that Congress could conclude that enhancing the political power of the Puerto Rican community by conferring the right to vote was an appropriate means of
23
remedying discriminatory treatment in public services.'
With respect to this theory, he observed that "the Court's opinion made clear that Congress could impose on the states a remedy for the denial of equal protection that elaborated upon the
direct command of the Constitution."' 24 As for Morgan's "definitional" branch, Justice Stewart referred only to that part of
the pertinent Morgan discussion which parenthetically
stated,125 in Justice Stewart's words, "that Congress could conclude that the New York statute was tainted by'the impermissible purpose of denying the right to vote to Puerto Ricans, an
undoubted invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause."' 26 Thus, Justice Stewart opined that Morgan's definitional discussion established only that Congress "could override state laws on the ground that they were in fact used as
instruments of invidious discrimination even though a court in
lowering of the voting age ... [is] within the ordinary legislative
power of Congress.
After much reflection I have reached the conclusion that I ought
not to allow stare decisi.s to stand in the way of casting my vote in accordance with what I am deeply convinced the Constitution demands.
400 U.S. at 217-18.
119. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
120. Oregon, 400 U.S. at 294. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99.
121. 400 U.S. at 293 (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 296.
123. Id. at 295.
124. Id. at 296.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
126. 400 U.S. at 295-96.
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an individual lawsuit might not have reached that factual conclusion."'1 27 Nothing in Morgan, Justice Stewart insisted, empowered Congress to interpret the Constitution.128
V. THE STATUS OF MORGAN'S DEFINITIONAL BRANCH
AFTER OREGON
A.

CONGRESSIONAL REASSESSMENT OF THE STRENGTH OF

GOVERNMENT INTERESTS

An examination of Justice Brennan's discussion of Congress's definitional authority-in his opinion for the Court in
Morgan and for three Justices in Oregon-discloses that Congress is empowered to reassess instances in which the Court
has subjected a state law to strict scrutiny and has upheld it on
the ground that it is "necessary to promote a compelling state
interest."129 If Congress, upon making its own investigation of
the matter, finds that the state rule fails this test, it may prohibit the rule. To what extent does this grant of congressional
revisionary power extend beyond the Court's equal protection
decisions? For example, may Congress also overturn state and
local regulations on the ground that they abridge the protection
of the first amendment's freedoms of expression and association, the constitutional right of privacy, or the fourteenth
amendment's guarantee of procedural due process?
1. Freedom of Expression and Association
The first amendment cases provide a close analogy because
127. Id. at 296.
128. Id. at 295. Justice Stewart appears to attempt to narrow the holding

under Morgan's definitional branch while simultaneously denying its existence.
His aversion to it is perhaps best revealed by his concluding remark: "I concurred in MR. JUSnCE HARLAN's dissent in Morgan... [which], as I now read

it, gave congressional power under § 5 the furthest possible legitimate reach.
Yet to sustain the constitutionality of . . . [the eighteen-year-old provision]
would require an enormous extension of that decision's rationale." Id. at 296
(emphasis added).
In discussing both the majority opinion in Morgan and Justice Brennan's

opinion in Oregon, Justice Stewart tends to characterize the concept of congressional power to interpret the Constitution in terms of congressional power
to determine what are and what are not compelling state interests for equal
protection purposes. See, e.g., Oregon, 400 U.S. at 293, 295, 296. This, as this Article has suggested, is the most persuasive and sensible interpretation of Justice Brennan's position. See supra text accompanying notes 96-100, 111, 112.
Only once, at the very end of his Oregon opinion, does Justice Stewart consider
the concept in terms of Congress's power to "determine as a matter of substantive constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit of ... [the equal
protection] clause." 400 U.S. at 296.
129. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627.
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their method of reasoning is similar to equal protection analysis. When the Court finds that a state or local rule burdens the
freedoms of expression or association (made applicable to the
states by the fourteenth amendment), the law is ordinarily held
invalid unless the government sustains a heavy burden of justification. Indeed, the judicial standard of review is often expressed in language-such as "closest scrutiny"' 3 0 and
"necessary to a compelling state interest"13 1 -that is virtually
identical to that used under the equal protection clause for appraising laws that draw suspect classifications or burden fundamental rights. Thus, under Justice Brennan's reasoning, it
would seem that if the Court were to uphold such a law, Congress could reevaluate the state interest that the Court found
sufficient and, if it were to disagree with the Court's conclusion,
effectively "reverse" the Court and enact a federal statute
prohibiting the offensive state law.
The 1925 decision in Gitlow v. New York132 provides an apt
illustration. Gitlow involved a challenge to New York's "criminal anarchy" statute, under which defendant, a member of the
left wing section of the Socialist Party, was convicted for arranging to print and distribute a "Left Wing Manifesto" advocating the "Communist Revolution" through such devices as
mass political strikes. The Court acknowledged that the first
amendment freedom of expression was implicated, but nevertheless sustained the conviction on the ground that "utterances
advocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence, and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and involve such danger of substantive evil that they may
be penalized in

the exercise

of ...

[the state's]

police

power." 33 Had Congress determined that advocacy of this kind
did not pose a sufficient "danger of substantive evil," it could,
under Justice Brennan's definitional theory, have legislated
pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to preempt
the criminal anarchy statute of New York (and of other states
as well).
The recent case of Zurcher v. Stanford Daily134 affords an
example directly in point. In Zurcher, the police searched the
130. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
131. See, e.g., Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184 (1979); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 546 (1963).
132. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
133. Id. at 668.
134. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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Stanford Daily's files, pursuant to a warrant, seeking evidence
in the form of photographs and film to establish the criminal
culpability of persons (not associated with the newspaper) who
had been involved in an unlawful demonstration that the newspaper had covered. The Daily contended that this abridged its
first amendment freedom of the press to gather, analyze and
disseminate news. The Court seemingly conceded that "First
1 35
Amendment interests would be endangered by the search,"
but held that "[p]roperly administered, the preconditions for a
[search] warrant... should afford [the press] sufficient protection."' 36 Two years later, Congress, directly responding to
the Court's ruling,137 enacted the Privacy Protection Act of
1980,138 which prohibited the type of police search upheld in
Zurcher. Consistent with the definitional approach I have attributed to Justice Brennan in Morgan and Oregon, the Privacy
Protection Act may be understood to reflect Congress's judgment that, on balance, the state's interest in apprehending
criminals is inadequate to justify the chilling effect that police
searches of newspaper files may have on the exercise of first
amendment rights.
Although the legislative authority sketched in the above illustrations would permit Congress to alter the result in those
instances in which the Court has found (or would find) that a
freedom of expression or association claim is outweighed by a
competing government interest, it would not authorize unlimited congressional power to liberalize the Justices' conclusions
in regard to first amendment concerns. For example, the Court
has long held that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press."'1 39 Thus, this kind of verbal
or visual expression receives no first amendment protection,
not because the state has an overriding interest in shielding the
public from sexually explicit matter, but rather because obscene material a priori has simply not been held to be
"speech" within the meaning of the first amendment. If Congress, acting pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, were to prohibit state or local obscenity regulations that
had passed (or would pass) judicial muster, it would not be
135. Id. at 565.

136. Id.
137. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily: Hearings on H.R. 3486 and H.R. 4181
before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,and the Administration of Jus-

tice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1979).
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5-2000aa-7, 2000aa-11, 2000aa-12 (Supp. IV
1980).
139. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
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simply reevaluating the strength of the government's interest
in suppressing pornography, but would rather be redefining the
meaning of the term "speech" as construed by the Court under
the first amendment. Thus, such a hypothetical federal statute
could only be upheld under a much broader reading of Morgan's definitional branch than may properly be inferred.
2. Right of Privacy
Analogous problems arise with respect to the constitutional
right of privacy. In Roe v. Wade, 140 which ruled that the fourteenth amendment grants women a constitutional right to terminate pregnancies, the Court also held that, after the point of
viability is reached, the privacy right is outweighed--"except
where it is necessary . . . for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother"14 1 -- by the state's compelling interest in
preserving fetal life. Under Morgan's definitional theory, Congress would presumably be free to readjust this balance to
favor maternal privacy rights after viability over the state's interest in protecting potential life-at least to the extent that
this did not itself violate the individual constitutional rights of
the fetus (an issue beyond the scope of this discussion).142 By
14 3
contrast, the issue posed in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney
is analogous to the obscenity example under the first amend
ment. The Court's summary affirmance in Doe implied that, according to the Justices' interpretation of the Constitution,
consensual homosexual activity simply does not fall within the
right of privacy secured by the fourteenth amendment. Thus,
under my understanding of the scope of Morgan's definitional
branch, Congress could not alter that conclusion.
3. ProceduralDue Process
As in the first amendment and right of privacy areas, some
procedural due process cases present basic interpretive questions of substantive constitutional coverage, while others involve only the balancing of individual rights against
government interests where judicial decision has already established the applicability of the constitutional principle.
Bishop v. Wood' 44 typifies the category of cases that Con140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 165.
See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
425 U.S. 901 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 32.
426 U.S. 341 (1976).
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gress cannot reverse without itself defining the terms of the

Constitution. In Bishop, the Court rejected a policeman's asserted denial of procedural due process in connection with the
termination of his employment. The Court did not reach the issue of whether the fourteenth amendment required that any
particular procedures be used in the termination process. Instead, it concluded that since, under state law, the policeman
"held his position at the will and pleasure of the city,"145 he
possessed no "property" interest in his continued employment
entitled to be protected by due process. Thus, Congress could
not change the result in Bishop without redefining the Court's
concept of "property" for purposes of due process. 4 6
The case of Mathews v. Eldridge' 47 falls into the other category. In Mathews, the Court agreed that plaintiffs possessed a
"property" interest in continued Social Security disability benefits,148 but held that procedural due process did not require an
evidentiary hearing prior to termination.14 9 In reaching this
judgment, the Court weighed three factors: 1) the importance
to the individual of the property interest affected;' 5 0 2) the risk
associated with denial of the requested procedural safeguards
and the probable benefits to be derived from their implementation;15 ' and 3) the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burden that the requested procedure would entail.152 It is true that the congressional reevaluation required under the Mathews three pronged
formula may be seen as somewhat more unbounded than Congress merely concluding that a state lacks a compelling or overBut, since the judicially
riding basis for its regulation.
established process in Mathews calls for open balancing of values rather than simply finding a rational basis for the legislative judgment, and since one of the factors to be balanced is the
strength of the government interest, which Congress is ideally
145. Id. at 345.
146. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) ("reputation alone, apart
from some more tangible interests such as employment" is neither "'liberty'
[n]or 'property' by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the
Due Process Clause").
147. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
148. As the disability benefits at issue were provided by the federal government, rather than by a state, Mathews is relevant to the present discussion only
by way of analogy.
149. 424 U.S. at 349.
150. Id. at 341-43.
151. Id. at 343-47.
152. Id. at 347-48.
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suited to discount, 5 3 Morgan's definitional branch, as explicated by Justice Brennan in Oregon, appears broad enough to
empower Congress to "reverse" the decision. Unlike a "reversal" of Bishop, such a reassessment requires no reinterpretation of constitutional concepts by Congress.
B.

CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS OF IMPERMISSIBLE MOTIVATION

This Article has several times adverted to, but not seriously considered, another aspect of Morgan's definitional discussion-the principle parenthetically stated by the Court'5 4
which, by Justice Stewart's description in Oregon, held that
Congress "could override state laws on the ground that they
were in fact used as instruments of invidious discrimination
even though a court in an individual lawsuit might not have
reached the factual conclusion."' 5 5 Although it appears to be
true, as Justice Stewart contended, that this does not broadly
empower Congress to "determine as a matter of substantive
constitutional law what situations fall within the ambit" of the
equal protection clause, 5 6 nonetheless, this part of Morgan's
definitional discussion-which may be denominated as "definitional" primarily because it appears in that paragraph of the
Morgan opinion-affords Congress a potentially important
power to combat state action that has a racially (or sexually)
disproportionate impact.
1. Congress's InstitutionalAdvantages
5
Under the rule of Washington v. Davis1
7 and PersonnelAd58
ministrator v. Feeney,1 de facto discrimination against suspect or quasi-suspect classes is presumptively violative of
equal protection if the rule producing it can be shown to have
5 9
been promulgated for "an invidious discriminatory purpose."
For several reasons that are rooted in Congress's institutional
structure, its authority to make determinations of discriminatory purpose, and thereby "override state laws," carries significantly more farreaching consequences than the judiciary's
ability to do so.
First, federal courts may address themselves only to cases

153. See supra text accompanying note 113.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
155. 400 U.S. at 296.
156. Id.
157. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
158. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
159. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
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properly brought before them and ordinarily grant relief only
with respect to the specific state or local practices under attack.
By contrast, Congress may, at its own initiative, undertake a
comprehensive study of the challenged rules. If Congress finds
that they are often enacted, maintained, or utilized for discriminatory purposes, or that they nearly always produce a discriminatory impact and have only scant legitimate justification, then
Congress may conclude that such practices are "instruments of
invidious discrimination" and prohibit them on a broad scale.
Thus, after Congress concluded that literacy tests in a number
of states had been "specifically designed to prevent Negroes
from voting,"160 the Voting Rights Act of 1965 suspended all
such tests and similar voting qualifications in all political subdivisions that met the objective criteria found in those areas "for
61
which there was evidence of actual voting discrimination."1
And, five years later, Congress went the final distance, extending the ban on such voting "tests and devices"
62
nationwide.1
Second, it has been generally recognized that since "judicial inquiries into legislative or executive motivation represent
a substantial intrusion into the workings of other branches of
government,' 63 it is extremely difficult for plaintiffs challenging state or local action under the fourteenth or fifteenth
amendments to carry their burden of proving discriminatory intent.164 Moreover, in many judicial proceedings, the plaintiff
may be unable to prevail even if one or more state officials actually admit to impermissible motivation or accuse their colleagues of such misconduct. For, under the Court's holding in
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., "[p]roof that the decision ... was motivated in
part by a racially discriminatory purpose" simply shifts to the
state "the burden of establishing that the same decision would
have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been
considered.' 65 Congress, however, is not limited by this judi66
cially constructed evidentiary rule of "but for" causation.1
160. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310 (1966).
161. Id. at 330.
162. See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 112.
163. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 268 n.18 (1977).
164. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 136-39 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Karst, The Costs of Motive-Centered Inquiry, 15 SAN DiEoo L
REV. 1163, 1165 (1978).
165. 429 U.S. at 271 n.21.
166. See infra text accompanying notes 167-75.
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Nor is it as unseemly for Congress, which is composed of representatives from the states whose officials effectively stand accused, to find that state and local practices are in deliberate
defiance of the Constitution.
In sum, when Congress bans a state or local practice that it
has found to be an instrument of invidious discrimination, it
may not only be saving the victims of that practice the inconvenience and delay associated with proving discriminatory intent to a court's satisfaction, but it may also be affording relief
to many challengers who could not have shouldered the burden
of proof mandated by the Court's decisions. Thus, Congress
may eradicate much that is in fact unconstitutional which
would otherwise go undetected or uncured.
2. The Relevance of City of Rome v. United States
The recent decision in City of Rome v. United States 167 provides an excellent illustration of a congressional statute barring
state de facto discrimination for "remedial" or "prophylactic"
purposes. In City of Rome, the city was subject to a provision
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that mandated preclearance of
any new voting regulation by either the Attorney General or a
three-judge federal district court in the District of Columbia.168
When the Attorney General refused to approve various
changes in the city's electoral system on the ground that they
failed the Voting Rights Act requirement that the change "does
not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,"'169 the
city sought judicial relief. The three-judge federal court found
that the city had not intentionally erected any barriers to black
voting or black candidacy in the past seventeen years and had
proved that the electoral changes were not the product of discriminatory motivation, but nonetheless ruled against the city
because the "disapproved electoral changes.., did have a discriminatory effect."170 The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting
the city's challenge to the constitutionality of the Voting Rights
Act as applied to these facts.
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that, pursuant to the enabling clauses of the Civil War
amendments, Congress may--"if necessary to effectively pre167. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976).
169. Id.
170. 446 U.S. at 172.
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vent purposeful discrimination by a governmental unit"--prohibit a state or local practice "which may not itself violate the
Constitution."1'7 They acknowledged that
Congress had before it evidence that various governments were enactto prevent the participation of blacks in local
ing electoral changes.
government by measures other than outright denial of the franchise.
Congress could of course remedy and prevent such purposeful discrimAnd given the difficulination on the part of local governments ....
ties of proving that an electoral change or annexation has been
undertaken for the purpose of discriminating against blacks, Congress
could properly conclude that as a remedial matter it was necessary to
place the burden of proving lack of discriminatory purpose on the localities. See South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). But all
of this does not support the conclusion that Congress is acting remedially when it continues the presumption of purposeful discrimination
even after the locality has disproved that presumption. Absent other
circumstances, it would be a topsy-turvy judicial system which held
that electoral changes which have been affirmatively proved to be perthe Constitution nonetheless violate the
missible under
172
Constitution.

Justices Rehnquist and Stewart concluded that "the result of
the Court's holding is that Congress effectively has the power
to determine for itself ... [what] conduct violates the Constitution,"1 73 and that-any implications in Morgan's definitional
branch to the contrary notwithstanding' 7 4 -this "violates previously well-established distinctions between the Judicial Branch
and the Legislative or Executive Branches of the Federal
75
Government."'
Properly understood, however, the City of Rome decision
does not rely on the broad thrust of Morgan's definitional
branch. It is true that the City of Rome rationale permits Congress to create a "conclusive presumption" of racial motivation
with respect to specified state or local practices that Congress
finds have been widely or consistently employed for the purpose of disadvantaging racial minorities-and thus effectively
authorizes a congressional conclusion that such practices violate the substance of the fourteenth amendment. But this is a
much narrower license than empowering Congress to declare
that all state or local rules with a racially disproportionate impact violate equal protection for that reason alone. Rather, City
of Rome invokes the parenthetically stated aspect of Morgan's
definitional discussion that I am now exploring. As noted
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 213.
at 214-15 (footnote omitted).
at 211.
at 220 n.8.
at 211.
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above, a variety of factors make it extremely difficult for plaintiffs to prove that a state legislative or administrative body has
acted with discriminatory intent and make it much more appropriate for Congress than for the judiciary to combat the problem of illicit motivation. Thus, there are powerful reasons for
Congress to choose not to rely upon district judges for the highly sensitive task of ascertaining racially discriminatory intent
on a case by case basis in respect to state or local schemes
whose real purpose Congress has grounds to suspect. The
Court's opinion in City of Rome did no more than recognize
this reality when it upheld the Voting Rights Act, as applied, on
what is principally a remedial or prophylactic rationale:
[T] he Act's ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is
an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth
Amendment, even if it is assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits
only intentional discrimination in voting. Congress could rationally
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a
demonstrated history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit
17 6
changes that have a discriminatory impact.

3.

Congress's Factfinding Obligations

A critical issue remains, applicable to all exercises of congressional power under the Civil War amendments, 7 7 but highlighted by this part of Morgan's definitional branch. Since
Congress's authority to prohibit practices that it finds to be intentionally discriminatory is intimately connected to the legislative branch's superior factfinding ability, to what extent will
the Court require that Congress follow any particular factfinding procedure? Will the Court attempt to determine whether
Congress engaged in any factfinding activity at all, or will it
simply assume that Congress found whatever facts might be
necessary to support the legislation?
In Morgan, the Court apparently operated on the latter assumption. It is true that Justice Brennan noted that "Congress
was aware"17 8 of the inculpatory statements made at New
York's 1916 constitutional convention indicating that "prejudice
played a prominent role in the enactment of the [literacy] requirement."179 But this implication that some type of congres176. Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
177. The issue is specifically referred to supra, in the text following note 36
and pertains, for example, to much of the discussion supra in text accompanying notes 154-76.
178. 384 U.S. at 654 n.14.
179. Id. at 654. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
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sional consideration of the pertinent facts must take place is
refuted by the fact that there is nothing in the "remedial"
branch of the Morgan opinion which even hints that Congress
ever affratively considered whether (much less formally
found that) Puerto Ricans had ever been discriminated against,
were presently being discriminated against, or were in any future danger of being discriminated against with respect to government services by any organ of New York state or local
government-the constitutional violation which the Court
thought that the Act of Congress might have been designed to
cure. Indeed, a major point in Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan was that, since "there were no committee hearings or reports referring to this section [of the Voting Rights Act], which
was introduced from the floor,"' 8 0 there was "simply no legislative record supporting such hypothesized discrimination"
against Puerto Ricans.181
One can only speculate whether the present Court would
permit Congress to ban a state or local practice pursuant to its
Civil War amendments powers without first making at least
some findings. But there is substantial indication in the opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell in Fullilove v.
Klutznick182 that, although the Court will probably demand
some "reasonable" factfinding activity by Congress,183 the requirement will not be a very rigorous one. 184 Thus, Justice
Powell observed that the Court cannot
Congress is not
treat Congress as if it were a lower federal court ....
expected to act as if it were duty bound to find facts and make conclusions of law. The creation of national rules for governance of our society simply does not entail the same concept of recordmaking that is
appropriate to a judicial or administrative proceeding. Congress has no
responsibility to confine its vision to the facts and evidence adduced by
particular parties. Instead, its special attribute as a legislative body
lies in its broader mission to investigate and consider all facts and
opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of an issue. 185

And Chief Justice Burger opined that "Congress, of course,
may legislate without compiling the kind of 'record' appropriate
86
with respect to judicial or administrative proceedings."1
Since it would seem that this factfinding element will not pose
180. 384 U.S. at 669 n.9.
181. Id. at 669.

182. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
183. See 448 U.S. at 503 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring).
184. See Choper, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action: Views From
the Supreme Court 70 Ky. L.J. 1, 11-14 (1982).

185.

448 U.S. at 502-03.

186.

Id. at 478.
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a substantial obstacle, there is reason to believe that the
parenthetically stated part of Morgan's definitional branch
could effectively support future congressional efforts to address
at least some instances of state action that produce de facto
discrimination.
VI. TANGENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS SINCE OREGON
Justice Stewart's emphasis in Oregon on Morgan's remedial branch has tended to foretell the future of the definitional
branch. Since the Court's 1970 decision in Oregon, two major
cases have sustained the constitutionality of congressional exercises of power under the enabling clauses of the fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments. In both decisions, the Court relied
almost exclusively on Morgan's remedial branch, ignoring its
farreaching definitional approach altogether. Although the federal statutes in both cases-Fullilove v. Klutznick, 18 7 involving
a set-aside of government contract funds for minority businesses, and City of Rome v. United States,188 involving a provision of the Voting Rights Act prohibiting certain states from
enacting new voting regulations that were discriminatory in
either purpose or effect-could have readily been upheld under
the narrower remedial or prophylactic theories, each could as
easily have been sustained by invoking Morgan's definitional
rationale, at least as spaciously conceived.189
The absence of recent decisions upholding federal legislation under Morgan's broad definitional branch, taken in isolation, may suggest that the Court is retreating from any theory
that might be read as empowering Congress to interpret the
Constitution. Yet opinions in a few cases involving constitutional provisions other than the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments-although concededly not free of ambiguity-permit the inference that reports of the death of the definitional
rationale may be premature.
187. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
188. 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
189. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), holds that government practices that are not racially discriminatory in intent but only in effect are not subject to strict judicial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Id. at 242.
Therefore, under the Court's standard, the allocation of government funds in
Fullilove (without any preference for racial and ethnic minorities) and the
state voting regulations in Rome would appear to be valid despite their producig racially disproportionate impacts. Nonetheless, Congress's corrective measures could arguably have been sustained as exercises of congressional power to
expansively define the substantive scope of the equal protection clause.
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CASE OR CONTROVERSY

In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 190 decided in 1972, the issue was whether white residents of an
apartment complex had standing to complain that the owner
racially discriminated in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1968.191 The Court held that plaintiffs satisfied the conventional
"injury in fact" requirement for standing because of their allegation that they were stigmatized by living in a white ghetto
and were deprived of the social and economic benefits of living
in an integrated community.192 Justice White, joined by Justices Blackmun and Powell, concurred. They expressed skepticism about the Court's ruling-that the white plaintiffs had
sustained sufficient injury to satisfy the article I "case or controversy" requirement-but agreed that the suit could nonetheless be maintained. In but a single sentence, Justice White
cryptically implied that Congress, in enacting the Civil Rights
Act, chose to carve a special exception to article III standing requirements in order to permit a broader class of persons to sue,
and that this was a valid exercise of congressional power-citing those pages in Katzenbach v. Morgan and in Justice Brennan's Oregon v. Mitchell opinion enunciating Morgan's
93
definitional theory.1
There is, of course, nothing extraordinary in Justice
White's reliance on this authority-despite its enigmatically expansive use of Morgan's definitional branch' 9 4-- for he agreed
with both the Court in Morgan and Justice Brennan in Oregon.
But Justice Blackmun's joining Justice White's concurrence is
more difficult to explain since, in Oregon, Justice Blackmun
voted with Justice Stewart in rejecting Morgan's definitional
branch. Conceivably, Justice Blackmun's action in Trafficante
190. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
191. 18 U.S.C. §§ 231-233, 241, 242, 245, 1153, 2101, 2102 (1976); 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1303, 1311, 1312, 1321-1326, 1331, 1341 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976); 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973j, 3533, 3535, 3601-3619, 3631 (1976). The specific provision at issue
in Trafficante was 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1976).
192. 409 U.S. at 209-10.
193. Id. at 212.
194. It has been urged that Justice White's opinion does no more than "give
due respect to Congress's empirical judgment that the denial of interracial contacts to tenants of segregated housing constituted an injury in fact. It does not
mean that he would submit to Congress's legal conclusion that there is an article Im case or controversy." Gordon, The Nature and Uses of Congressional
Power Under Section Five of the FourteenthAmendment to Overcome Decisions
of the Supreme Court 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 656, 658 n.13 (1977). But the line between these alternatives may well be too thin to deny Justice White's implicit
grant of substantial definitional power to Congress.
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may be understood in terms either of his intermittently expansive interpretation of the Court's "traditional concepts of standing,"' 95 or of an increasingly generous conception of
congressional power in general under the Civil War amendments, as evidenced by his association with the Court's opinion
in City of Rome.
Justice Powell's concurrence with Justice White in Trafficante is even more perplexing. Justice Powell, unlike Justice
Blackmun, did not sit in Oregon and thus could not join Justice
Stewart in condemning broad definitional theories of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment. Yet in City of
Rome, Justice Powell dissented (as did Justices Rehnquist and
Stewart), taking a relatively narrow view of congressional
power, even under Morgan's remedial branch. It is possible to
explain Justice Powell's position in Trafficante as resting on a
special congressional capacity to address constitutional issues
of separation of powers between the judicial and political
branches.196 But, to the extent that Justice Powell is wary of
Morgan's relatively conservative remedial branch, it would
seem that he would probably be even less favorably disposed
toward Morgan's more generous definitional branch.

B. THE RELIGION CLAUSES
In Welsh v. United States,197 decided the same year as Oregon, petitioner challenged section 6(j) of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act,198 which exempted from combat only
those persons whose conscientious objection to war derived
from "religious training and belief." The Court avoided the
constitutional question of whether this constituted an estab195. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 757 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). There are at least some indications that Justice Blackmun's views on
the substantive issue before the Court-such as abortion (see his opinion for
the Court in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973), and his plurality opinion
in Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976)) and protection of the environment
(see his dissenting opinion in Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 757, and his concurring
opinion in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 699 (1973); cf. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring) )-may influence his treatment of the
standing question. For a more restrictive position on standing by Justice
Blackmun, see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). But see, in addition
to Trafficante, Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc. 102 S. Ct. 752, 768 (1982) (Blackmun, J., joining
with Brennan, J., dissenting).
196. See infra note 205.
197. 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
198. 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1976).
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lishment of religion by construing the statute to exempt a very
broad class of conscientious qbjectors.199 Justice White, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart, dissented from
this interpretation of the draft law and, confronting the constitutional problem, reasoned that it could only be resolved
through a balancing of Congress's power to raise armies and
the competing values embodied in the first amendment's establishment clause and free exercise clause.20 0 "[T]his Court,"
Justice White wrote,
is not alone in being obliged to construe the Constitution in the course
of its work; nor does it even approach having a monopoly on the wisdom and insight appropriate to the task ....

It is very likely that

§ 6(j) is a recognition by Congress of free exercise values and its view
the Free Exercise
of desirable or required policy in implementing
201
Clause. That judgment is entitled to respect.

Justice White then relied on Morgan's definitional branch to
control the outcome in Welsh:
It is surely essential ... in enacting laws for the raising of armies to
take account of the First Amendment and to avoid possible violations
of the Free Exercise Clause. If this was the course Congress took, then
just as in Katzenbach v. Morgan,... where we accepted the judgment
of Congress as to what legislation was appropriate to enforce the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, here we should respect congressional judgment accommodating the Free Exercise
Clause and the power to raise armies. This involves no surrender of
the Court's function as ultimate arbiter in disputes over interpretation
of the Constitution. But it was enough in Katzenbach "to perceive a
basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did,". ..
and plainly in the case before us there is an arguable basis for § 6(j) in
the Free Exercise Clause since, without the exemption, the law would
compel some members of the public to engage in combat operations
There being substantial
contrary to their religious convictions ....
roots in the Free Exercise Clause for § 6(j) I would not frustrate congressional will by construing the Establishment Clause to condition
exemption also to
the exemption for religionists upon extending the
2 02
those who object to war on nonreligious grounds

As is true in Trafficante, Justice White's position in Welsh
grants Congress a quite generous authority to define the terms
of the Constitution and appears to reflect a broader interpretation of Morgan's definitional branch than this Article has attributed to Morgan's author, Justice Brennan.203 The decisions of
199. 398 U.S. at 342. See Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First AmendU. ILL LF. - (1982).
200. 398 U.S. at 371. See generally Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment Reconciling the Conflic4 41 U. Prrr. L REV. 673, 698-700 (1980).
201. 398 U.S. at 370-71.
202. Id. at 371-72.
203. The interpretation suggested by this Article is that the Court's opinion
in Morgan (and Justice Brennan's opinion in Oregon) sought only to empower
ment, -
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Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart to join Justice White,
however, are puzzling. In the very year that Welsh was decided, they voiced strenuous opposition in Oregon to the idea
that Congress could define the terms of the Constitution pursuant to the enabling clause of the fourteenth amendment.
A possible, if not very persuasive, explanation is that Welsh
involved congressional balancing of judicially approved constitutional values, whereas Oregon involved congressional creation of new constitutional doctrine. 204 Yet Justice White's
opinion in Welsh contains no elucidation of why Congress is institutionally better adapted to balancing constitutional doctrines than to extending or creating them.205 In any event, it
may be fair to conclude that Welsh poses some question as to
the strength and nature of Chief Justice Burger's future opposition to a broad reading of Morgan's definitional branch.

C. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
Some further possible exceptions to the view that the
Court has abandoned any vast authority that may have existed
under Morgan's definitional approach may be found in two recent decisions involving the scope of Congress's power to enforce the thirteenth amendment. These cases invoke the
principle of Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer which grants Congress authority "rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and to translate that determination into
20 6
effective legislation."
The first is McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co., 207 decided in 1976, raising the question of whether the Civil
Congress to make legislative findings regarding the non-existence of the compelling basis necessary to support a state discrimination in respect to suspect
classifications or fundamental rights.
204. In a sense, Trafficante may also be explained under the "balancing"
theory of Welsh, Justice White deferring to Congress's decision to strike a balance between article III and fourteenth amendment values.
205. Indeed, to the extent that Welsh involved questions of individual rights
while Oregon involved only federalism concerns, Congress is eminently better
able to resolve the constitutional values at stake in Oregon than in Welsh. See
supra text accompanying note 113. Viewed from this perspective, Trafficante
raised a question of separation of powers between the national political
branches on one side and the judiciary on the other, a factor that may have influenced Justice Powell. Compare his concurring opinion in United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194-96 (1974), with his opinions for the Court in Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975) and Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 39, 41-42 (1976). But see J. CHOPER, supra note 113, at ch. 6.
206. 392 U.S. at 439-40.
207. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
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Rights Act of 1866,208 enacted pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment, barred discrimination against whites as well as
blacks. At no time had the Court either held or in any way implied that such discrimination violated section 1 of the thirteenth amendment. Nonetheless, Justice Marshall, writing for
a majority of seven-with only Justices White and Rehnquist
disagreeing at all (and then only as to statutory interpretation)-found that the Act did extend protection to whites, and,
in a one sentence footnote that contained the totality of the
Court's discussion of the constitutional aspect of the issue,
stated that "the Court has previously ratified the view that
Congress is authorized under the Enforcement Clause of the
Thirteenth Amendment to legislate in regard to 'every race and
individual.' Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1906); see
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co ..... ",209
To the extent that McDonald authorized Congress to break
from the historical roots of the thirteenth amendment and extend the meaning of "badges and incidents of slavery" to cover
persons other than descendants of slaves, the case may be
cited to support congressional possession of significant definitional power under the Civil War amendments. But, as suggested above, 2 10 McDonald may only represent judicial
approval of Congress's remedial power under the thirteenth
amendment-the theory being that "there is a basis in experience for a congressional conclusion that discrimination against
one racial group affects attitudes towards race generally, and
promotes discrimination against other races. 211 In any event,
McDonald's quite perfunctory treatment of this profound question in general greatly weakens its precedential force.
The most recent addition to the thirteenth amendment decisions, City of Memphis v. Greene,2 12 involved the city's closing
of a street, heavily traveled by blacks, that ran through a white
residential neighborhood. The Court's opinion by Justice Stevens-joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart,
Powell, and Rehnquist-denied the claim that the street closing
was a "badge or incident of slavery" on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to prove discriminatory intent. But, quoting lan208. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976). See supra note 76.
209. 427 U.S. at 288 n.18.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88.
211. Karst, Thirteenth Amendment: JudicialInterpretation, to be published
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTrTUION (L. Levy & K. Karst eds.) (ar-

ticle currently on file at University of Minnesota Law School).
212. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:299

guage from Jones, Justice Stevens went on to say that Congress
may "do much more" under the thirteenth amendment's enabling clause than section 1 of the amendment does "by its own
2 13
unaided force and effect."
Read most generously, this dicta from City of Memphis indicates that four current members of the Court-including
those least favorably disposed toward definitional theories of
congressional power under the Civil War amendments-would
grant Congress extensive authority to define the scope of the
thirteenth amendment. But the predictive validity of this computation may be seriously questioned-first, because those
joining Justice Stevens were probably far more attentive to the
opinion's holding than to its dicta, and second, because (as this
Article has observed) 2 14 the Jones rationale may probably be
more accurately construed as confirming Congress's remedial,
rather than its definitional power.
VII. CONCLUSION
The above survey of the case law demonstrates that Congress's power to define (or "interpret") the substance of the
Civil War amendments is significantly in doubt. Three current
members of the Court-Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall-have unequivocally declared their support for Morgan's
definitional branch, but careful examination of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Morgan and his separate opinion
in Oregon discloses that the scope of the definitional power
granted, although by no means insignificant, may nonetheless
be quite limited. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun,
while declaring vigorous opposition to Morgan's definitional
branch in Oregon, have cast votes in other cases (Trafficante
and Welsh), that create some doubt about the strength and nature of their antipathy to congressional interpretation of the
Constitution. Indeed, along with that of Justice White-the author of the relevant opinions in Trafficante and Welsh-the positions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun could be
read as implying even greater deference to Congress on this
question than the positions of Justices Brennan and Marshall.
Justice Rehnquist, echoing former Justices Harlan and Stewart
in his dissent in City of Rome, forcefully expressed his conviction that Morgan's definitional branch offends the constitutional separation of powers embodied in Marbury v.
213. Id. at 125.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 83-88, 210-11.
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Madison.m215 Justice Powell has not yet really addressed himself directly to the matter of Morgan's definitional branch, but
his views on apposite issues (his separate opinion in City of
Rome and his vote with Justice White in Trafficante) emit
seemingly conflicting signals. As for Justices Stevens and
O'Connor, there is no solid information at present concerning
their position on Morgan's definitional branch.
The Burger Court's efforts to readjust the balance between
state and national power in favor of the former, as dramatically
illustrated by National League of Cities v. Usery,216 imply hostility by a majority of incumbent Justices to doctrines that enhance congressional authority over state and local affairs. By
the same token, Fitzpatrickv. Bitzer,2 17 which stands as an explicit exception to Usery, 218 may yet prove to be a very broad
incursion indeed. This author's personal view is that the Court
should treat the constitutional issue of whether federal action
is beyond the authority of the central government and thus violates "states' rights" as nonjusticiable and leave its final resolution to the national political branches. 219 Indeed, although it is
beyond the scope of discussion in this paper, several recent
opinions-that for the Court in City of Rome and those of Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell in Fullilove v. Klutznick220on Congress's "remedial" power under the Civil War amendments suggest authentic steps in this direction. 22 1 But since a
present head count on the existence and reach of Morgan's
"definitional" branch produces substantial uncertainty, any
confident conclusion concerning its vitality must await the
future.

215. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
216. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
217. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
218. See City of Rome, 446 U.S. at 179.
219. See Choper, The Scope of NationalPower Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of JudicialReview, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
220. 448 U.S. 448, 453, 495 (1980).
221. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR & L TRIBE, THE SUPREME CoURT TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 1979-1980, at 29-39, 48-51 (1981).

